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Heuristics are simple, yet effective, strategies that people use to make decisions. Because heuristics do
not require all available information, they are thought to be easy to implement and to not tax limited
cognitive resources, which has led heuristics to be characterized as fast-and-frugal. We question this
monolithic conception of heuristics by contrasting the cognitive demands of two popular heuristics,
Tallying and Take-the-Best. We contend that heuristics that are frugal in terms of information usage may
not always be fast because of the attentional control required to implement this focus in certain contexts.
In support of this hypothesis, we find that Take-the-Best, while being more frugal in terms of information
usage, is slower to implement and fares worse under time pressure manipulations than Tallying. This
effect is then reversed when search costs for Take-the-Best are reduced by changing the format of the
stimuli. These findings suggest that heuristics are heterogeneous and should be unpacked according to
their cognitive demands to determine the circumstances a heuristic best applies.
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Some decision procedures are slow and information demanding
whereas others are “fast and frugal” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier,
2011), though for a dissenting opinion on the prevalence of heu-
ristic use see Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003), and Newell
(2005). Consider a scenario in which a child suddenly crosses the
street to get his ball. The driver has less than a second to evaluate
the situation and decide whether to press hard on the brakes
without swerving or press on the brakes and swerve onto the
sidewalk. The former option risks hitting the child and the latter
option risks hitting other pedestrians. The optimal decision de-
pends on cues such as the speed of the vehicle, the distance from
the car to other people, the car’s stopping distance, the number of
people on the sidewalk, the driver’s ability, and so forth. What is
the best way to integrate all this information quickly? Representing
and integrating all this information in an optimal manner may be
impossible or too time-consuming.
Alternatives to the computationally intensive decision strategies
are commonly referred to as fast and frugal heuristics (Todd &
Gigerenzer, 2000). Heuristics are fast in that they can be applied
quickly and frugal in the sense that they use less information to
make a decision than more complex procedures that selectively
weigh all information sources. Despite the fact that heuristics use
less information from the environment, in practice they can per-
form very well, often surpassing regression approaches for certain
decision problems (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999).
Heuristics have been described as “efficient cognitive processes,
conscious or unconscious, that ignore part of the information”
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) and as using “a minimum of
time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices in
real environments” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). This characteriza-
tion of heuristics differs from earlier accounts that cast heuristics
as imperfect approximations of rational decision procedures (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1974).
When complex decision strategies, such as multiple linear re-
gression, cannot be implemented because of resource constraints,
such as lack of time, people might use alternative strategies like
heuristics (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). In this study, we considered
whether two popular heuristics differ from one another in cogni-
tive processing requirements as reflected by timing constraints.
Specifically, we compared two popular heuristics, Tallying (TAL)
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and Take-the-Best (TTB), which we introduce by way of example
below. These heuristics follow from previous work, such as the
lexicographic heuristics that only take into account the most dis-
criminating attribute value (Fishburn, 1967; Tversky, 1969), the
majority of confirming dimensions heuristic (Russo & Dosher,
1983), and the equal weights strategy (Dawes, 1979).
Suppose one wants to predict whether China or India will have
higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth based on their pro-
ductive capabilities, natural resource wealth, and the diversity in
their exports, and so forth. The TAL heuristic chooses the country
that bests the other across the most measures. TAL does not
selectively weigh cues as linear regression does, but instead merely
counts the number of cues favoring one alternative over the other
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). On the other hand, the TTB
heuristic chooses based on the most predictive cue and only
considers the next best cue when there is a tie. TTB implies that
cues are rank ordered in terms of their predictive validity in
determining the criterion (e.g., in predicting China or India). TTB
sequentially searches until a discriminating cue is found and, thus,
may reach a decision after only considering the first best cue.
These two heuristics can both be effective in practice, but can
differ in their choices as shown in an example trial of our first
experiment in Figure 1.
We hypothesize that these two heuristics differ in their cognitive
processing requirements such that what is fast and what is frugal is
contingent on the cognitive processes invoked by the environment.
In Experiment 1, we predict that TTB will fare worse under time
pressure than TAL, whereas we predict the opposite pattern in
Experiment 2. Although one might expect TTB to be fast given
that it samples very little information (Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007;
Khader et al., 2011), the cognitive demands in Experiment 1
should be high for TTB users because the stimulus format invites
an effortful sequential search procedure. In contrast, the stimulus
format in Experiment 2 reduces this search burden while making it
more difficult for TAL users to perform rapid summation opera-
tions.
Our experimental procedures are intended to expand the scope
of inquiry by deviating from the original formulation of TTB
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) in which decisions were made from
memory for environments; instead our method invites participants
to make inference from givens in the environment. Although
memory demands are an important aspect of heuristic application,
our studies focus more on the attentional demands of applying
heuristics. Related previous efforts have noted that one subtle
complexity of TTB is that it requires a hierarchy of cue validities
(Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; Juslin & Persson,
2002) and that noncompensatory strategies such as TAL can be
affected by cue salience (Platzer & Bröder, 2012).
When compared with algorithms that are more computationally
intensive such as linear regression, TAL and TTB have various
algorithmic aspects in common. Their most salient similarity is
that they both disregard covariance structure among cues (Parpart,
Jones & Love, under revision). Both heuristics also disregard
relative cue weight magnitudes.
Despite these similarities, these two heuristics may differ in
their cognitive demands. For instance, TTB implements a search
for the best discriminating cue that has been argued to take time
(Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007) and a certain level of cognitive
control because of selective attention to the relevant cue, as well as
inhibition of the irrelevant ones. Such sequential control processes
are thought to be effortful, serial in nature, and time-consuming
(Posner & Presti, 1987). In effect, TTB has the prescription that
people will embark on a serial search, which in our first experi-
ment is a visually guided search. Such visually guided searches are
a common domain for research on top-down attentional control
mechanisms (Mozer & Baldwin, 2008; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel,
1989).
TALs cognitive requirements may be quite different than those
used for TTB. We argue that TAL requires people’s ability to do
quick summations over stimuli. Related research on numerosity
has shown that people can be very fast at doing these types of
operations without explicit counting (Feigenson, Dehaene, &
Figure 1. Example trial for the practice phase of Experiment 1. Participants were required to choose the
country that would have higher gross domestic product (GDP) for the following year depending on the values
of the economic statistics presented. Participants were assigned either to the Tallying (TAL) or the Take-the-Best
(TTB) condition and asked to respond according to what the respective heuristic would predict. In this example
trial, TAL would choose Country B because four cues have superior values (checkmarks) whereas Country A
is only superior on one cue. In contrast, TTB would choose Country A because the value for the best-
discriminating cue, which in this case is the third most predictive cue (i.e., “Increased employment opportuni-
ties”), is superior to Country B. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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Spelke, 2004; Mandler & Shebo, 1982). Given the right represen-
tation format of cues, a TAL decision problem could be reduced to
a low-level perceptual categorization problem (e.g., Palmer, Huk,
& Shadlen, 2005). However, if the representation format is not
suitable for such operations, as we manipulate in Experiment 2, we
predict that TALs performance should be reduced.
In Experiment 1, we predicted that compliance with the TAL
heuristic would be higher than for TTB under time pressure
conditions even though TAL considers more aspects of the stim-
ulus. In Experiment 2, we attempted to reverse this effect by
eliminating search costs for TTB and altering the stimulus format
in a manner that obstructs quick summation operations that favor
TAL performance. Together, these two studies aim to establish
that heuristics should be understood not only in terms of how they
perform in various information environments, but also in terms of
the cognitive processes they engage.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we test the hypothesis that the TTB heuristic
will not always lead to rapid decisions because of the search costs
and attentional control it can demand. For certain stimulus formats,
it should be possible for TAL to be faster than TTB. For example,
color-coded stimulus values should allow for rapid perceptual
integration of cue values, making TAL faster than TTB. Further-
more, TAL use should be unaffected by the randomization of cue
position across trials because TAL treats all cues identically and
summates. In contrast, TTBs search requirements should be in-
creased by this randomization and should not benefit from the
color coding. Thus, we predict that TAL should be faster than TTB
under these conditions because of the basic resource requirements
of each heuristic.
Method
Participants. Participants (206 total, 95 female) were re-
cruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online study platform
commonly used in psychological studies with good results
(Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). Participants were re-
stricted to the United States of America and assigned either to the
TAL condition (107 total, 58 female) or the TTB condition (99
total, 39 female). They received $2.50 to complete a 40 min
(approx.). learning and decision making task and the best partici-
pant was offered a $20 bonus in each condition. The average age
of participants was 37.9 years (SD  12.56). The study was
approved by the local UCL ethics committee.
Design and materials. As a between participants manipula-
tion, participants were explicitly instructed to use either TAL or
TTB in a two-alternative forced choice task (i.e., choosing which
country will have higher GDP). Each participant first completed a
practice phase (72 trials) followed by a test phase, consisting of
two blocks of trials. Whether the test block was self-paced (72
trials) or speeded (72 trials) was counterbalanced across trials.
Trial order was randomized separately for each participant.
Within participants, the same 72 trials were used across these
three (practice, self-paced test, and speeded test) experimental
segments. Trials were designed such that one response was con-
sistent with TAL and the other with TTB. In other words, the
heuristics disagreed on every trial, which allowed for discriminat-
ing heuristic use. Perfect performance is achievable for both heu-
ristics because we measured compliance with an instructed heu-
ristic (compliance with heuristic is understood as percent correct).
Conversely, expected performance under random responding was
at chance (50%). The presentation order of the cues was random-
ized on a trial-by-trial basis.
The 72 trials for each experimental segment consisted of
three trial types in terms of three difficulty levels. The 72 trials
were equally partitioned into the three trial types resulting in 24
trials for each difficulty level. Difficulty was defined differently
for each heuristic. For TTB, difficulty level is referred to as Q1
(cue 1), Q2 (cue 2), and Q3 (cue 3), in order of ascending
difficulty. Q1 trials represent trials where retrieving the value
for the best cue was sufficient to respond in compliance with
TTB. Similarly, Q2 trials require retrieving the value for the
second-best cue and Q3 trials require retrieving the value for
the third-best cue. For TAL, difficulty level is referred to as 3
(delta 3), 2 (delta 2), and 1 (delta 1), in order of ascending
difficulty. The 3 trial types represented trials where one
option was a better choice by a difference of three cue values,
2 trials represented trials where one option was a better choice
by a difference of two cue values, and the 1 trial types
represented trials where one option was a better choice by a
difference of only one cue value. Controlling for difficulty level
in each heuristic was also a way to verify that indeed partici-
pants were still trying to implement the respective heuristic in
each experimental condition. For both the TAL and TTB con-
dition, trials were randomly sampled from the same trial space
(see Table 1 and Table 2 in Section B of supplemental material
available online for more information on the exact sampling
procedure).
The seven cues shown on each trial were economic statistics
that would predict whether a developing country would achieve
higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) levels the following year
when compared with another developing country (see Section A
of supplemental material available online for a list of the
statistics). These statistics were artificially created and do not
correspond to any real-world data in keeping with our focus on
heuristic compliance as opposed to real-world performance. We
chose this domain in the hopes that it would be familiar in a
general sense while also unlikely to invite prior knowledge to
guide decisions (i.e., not strongly interfere with the instructed
heuristic use).
Procedure. Subjects were shown the seven cues on each trial
and asked to choose which country would have higher GDP the
following year. The two options were “Country A” or “Country
B.” Participants saw seven economic statistics with a value for
each country on each trial (see Figure 1 for an example of stimulus
presentation). Each statistic was framed as a comparison between
two options (i.e., two developing countries) where a checkmark
was presented if superior to the other option, a red cross was
presented if inferior to the other option, and a black equal’s sign
was presented for ties between countries on a given statistic. A list
which ranked the statistics in order of importance, with random-
ized order between participants, was presented on every trial in the
practice phase but not in the test phase. Before starting the practice
phase, participants were provided with detailed instructions on
how to use the corresponding heuristic for the condition they had
been assigned to (either TAL or TTB).
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In the practice phase, the participant would see the seven
statistics with a value for each country as well as the list that
ranked the statistics in order of importance. After making a re-
sponse, immediate feedback was provided on the screen. If the
participant responded in accordance with the heuristic, the screen
would show “Good! You understood the rule!”, in addition to an
explanation of why the choice was correct according to the heu-
ristic. If the participant did not respond in accordance with the
heuristic, the screen would show “Bad. You did not understand the
rule.”, in addition to an explanation of why the choice was incor-
rect according to the heuristic. The statistics with the values for
each country were left on screen during feedback but the list of
ranked statistics was not. The list was not presented during feed-
back to discourage reliance on the list and incentivize better
engagement with the task. Participants were not directly ques-
tioned about their knowledge of the cue validities. The feedback
was presented until the participant decided to move on to the next
trial followed by a presentation of a blank white screen for 500 ms.
Subsequently, the participant would enter either a block with
time pressure or a block without time pressure of the test phase.
The list which ranked the statistics in order of importance was
removed for the test phase. For the block without time pressure,
the participant was asked to answer in accordance with the heu-
ristic that had been practiced on previously, only this time without
feedback. The intertrial interval was 1,500 ms with the first second
showing “Thank You!” followed by a presentation of a blank
white screen for 500 ms. For the block with time pressure, the
participant was also asked to answer in accordance with the
heuristic practiced on previously and without feedback. Then,
instructions stating that the participant only had 2,000 ms to
respond on each trial were provided. The intertrial interval was
also 1,500 ms with the first second showing “Thank You!” fol-
lowed by a presentation of a blank white screen for 500 ms except
when the participant reached the 2,000 ms deadline. If the partic-
ipant reached the 2,000 ms deadline, the screen would explain why
it was important for them to adhere to the imposed deadline. This
screen was presented for 10,000 ms followed by a presentation of
a blank white screen for 500 ms.
Results
Exclusion criteria. Exclusion criteria were based on the re-
sponses made on the second half of the practice phase (36 trials)
and number of missed responses when under time pressure. Par-
ticipants with performance under 90% in the second half of the
practice phase or over 16 missed responses when under time
pressure were considered outliers and excluded from all subse-
quent analysis (26 in the TTB condition, 1 in the TAL condition).
Including the exclusion criteria from the practice phase, this re-
sulted in a total of 26.26% of participants who were excluded from
all further analyses in the TTB condition and 1% of participants
excluded from the TAL condition. Analyses were also run without
any exclusion1 and this did not change any conclusions from the
analyses shown below. All analyses that follow use people who
passed exclusion (n  179) to provide a more stringent evaluation
of our predictions. All response time analyses were calculated with
median response times. For a presentation of results from the
practice phase, please refer to Section D in supplemental material
available online.
Test phase. TTB participants had lower compliance than
TAL, mostly because they were affected more by the time pressure
manipulation (see panel A in Figure 2). Proportion of compliance
was analyzed using a 2 2 3 mixed-design analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with a between-subjects factor of heuristic (TAL,
TTB), a within-participants factor of time pressure (present or
absent), and a within-participants factor of trial difficulty (three
levels of trial difficulty). Main effects were observed for heuristic,
F(1, 177)  285.89, p  .001, 2  .62, time pressure, F(1,
177)  352.62, p  .001, 2  .67, and trial difficulty, F(2,
354)  13.85, p  .001, 2  .07, as well as an interaction
between heuristic and time pressure, F(1, 177)  329.37, p 
.001, 2 .65, an interaction between heuristic and trial difficulty,
F(2, 354)  4.53, p  .011, 2  .03, an interaction between time
pressure and trial difficulty, F(2, 354)  18.66, p  .001, 2 
.10, and the three-way interaction between heuristic, time pressure,
and trial difficulty, F(2, 354)  14.87, p  .001, 2  .08. These
results directly support our hypothesis by showing that TTB has
lower compliance than TAL, especially under time pressure. The
three-way interaction highlights the asymmetric effect of the time
pressure manipulation on both heuristics’ difficulty levels.
TTB participants responded more slowly than TAL participants
and were markedly slower on difficulty trials (see panels D, E, and
F in Figure 2). Response times were analyzed using a 2  2  3
mixed-design ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of heuristic
(TAL, TTB), a within-participants factor of time pressure (present
or absent) and with a within-participants factor of trial difficulty
(three levels of trial difficulty). Individual response times were
calculated as median response times. Main effects were observed
for heuristic, F(1, 177)  382.41, p  .001, 2  .68, time
pressure, F(1, 177)  370.92, p  .001, 2  .68, and trial
difficulty, F(2, 354)  470.60, p  .001, 2  .73, as well as an
interaction between heuristic and time pressure, F(1, 177) 
313.50, p  .001, 2  .64, an interaction between heuristic and
trial difficulty, F(2, 354)  248.39, p  .001, 2  .58, an
interaction between time pressure and trial difficulty, F(2, 354) 
285.34, p .001, 2  .62, and the three-way interaction between
heuristic, time pressure, and trial difficulty, F(2, 354)  265.66,
p  .001, 2  .60. The main effect of heuristic shows that TTB
is a slower heuristic than TAL and directly supports our main
hypothesis. The interaction between heuristic and time pressure
suggests that TAL can accommodate to time pressure more readily
than TTB can. The three-way interaction shows that trial difficulty
still shows differences between heuristics in both blocks, with and
without time pressure. This gives reassurance that participants
were still engaged and attempting to implement the respective
heuristic even for blocks with time pressure.
Model-based analysis. For the TTB participants, three mod-
els were fit to determine how many cues participants tended to
successfully incorporate under self-paced and speeded conditions.
The models are reduced versions of TTB. Only three models were
considered; TTB first-cue (only considers the first cue presented
on all trials), TTB first-two-cues (only considers the first and
1 We also conducted all analyses with participants that had 100% per-
formance in the second half of the practice phase (95 participants in the
TAL condition and 25 in the TTB condition) and this did not change any
conclusions presented here.
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second cue presented on all trials), and TTB-first-three-cues (only
considers the first, second and third cue presented on all trials). As
shown in Figure 3, the number of cues successfully incorporated
tended to be higher under self-paced conditions, suggesting that
the TTB procedure broke down under time pressure. Fisher’s exact
test found that the model contingencies differed across self-paced
and speeded conditions (p  .001).
Only models with three or fewer cues were considered because
only the first three cues were needed to comply with TTB in the
study design. Which model best fit each participant was deter-
mined by comparing the agreement in choices between human and
model. For the one and two cues models, agreement was scored as
.5 (i.e., the expectation for a random guess) for trials that exceeded
the cues encoded by the model because TTB guesses when there is
no discriminating cue. All three models are parameter-free and,
thus, are readily comparable. For the speeded blocks, the agree-
ment in choices between human and model were significantly
above chance (.5) for the best cue model, t(72)  2.81, p  .006,
but not for the two best cues model, t(72)  1.68, p  .097, or
three best cues model, t(72)  1.21, p  .229. Additional model
fits confirmed that participants were using the cues themselves, as
opposed to their positions (see Figure 1 of Section C in supple-
mental material available online).
Discussion
Experiment 1 strongly supported our a priori hypothesis:
TTB, however frugal, can be slow given its requirements with
respect to attentional control and search costs. This can be seen
by the lower proportion of compliance of the TTB heuristic
under time pressure, whereas the TAL heuristic maintains the
same proportion of compliance for both the self-paced and time
pressure conditions. We assume that this effect is because of
both the trial-by-trial randomization of the cue positions and the
format of the values shown (e.g., crosses and checkmarks).
These results highlight the importance of considering not only
the structure of the environment, but also the cognitive demands
of heuristics when pairing heuristics with tasks. Experiment 2
attempts to reverse the TAL advantage observed in Experiment
1 by using a stimulus format that favors TTB by reducing
search costs (helpful for TTB) and the possibility of perceptual
summation (harmful for TAL).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, TALs advantage over TTB was striking—
the less frugal (in terms of cues) heuristic was faster. We
predicted this pattern of results by considering the cognitive
Figure 2. Main results after applying exclusion criteria for Experiment 1 (n  179). The figure shows the
proportion of compliance with (a) both heuristics for blocks without time pressure (blue bars) and blocks with
time pressure (red bars), (b) the proportion of compliance in the Tallying (TAL) condition for blocks with and
without time pressure displayed by degrees of difficulty (deltas), and (c) the proportion of compliance in the
Take-the-Best (TTB) condition for blocks with and without time pressure displayed by degrees of difficulty (Qs).
Shows the response times for (d) both heuristics in both blocks with and without time pressure, (e) the response
times in the TAL condition for blocks with and without time pressure displayed by degrees of difficulty (deltas),
and (f) the response times in the TTB condition for blocks with and without time pressure displayed by degrees
of difficulty (Qs). For all panels, error bars are 95% within-participants confidence intervals. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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processes each heuristic requires. In Experiment 2, we at-
tempted to build on this result by creating conditions that
should favor TTB over TAL. In Experiment 2, the search costs
for TTB are reduced by ordering stimulus cues by their validity.
Unlike Experiment 1, the cues are no longer color-coded, which
prevents TAL from utilizing perceptual summation operations.
Mirroring Experiment 1, the format choice in Experiment 2
should strongly favor TAL over TTB.
Method
Participants. Participants (194 total, 128 female) were also
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were re-
stricted to the United States of America and assigned either to
the TAL condition (97 total, 63 female) or the TTB condition
(97 total, 65 female). They received $2.50 to complete a 40 min
(approx.) learning and decision making task and the best par-
ticipant was offered a $20 bonus in each condition. The average
age of participants was 41.5 years (SD  12.34). The study was
approved by the local UCL ethics committee.
Design and materials. The design and materials for the
experiment were similar to Experiment 1 with some critical
differences. Rather than order cues randomly on each trial, cues
were always ordered by their validity. Although the stimuli
consisted of the same economic statistics as in Experiment 1,
they were no longer color-coded (see Figure 4). Instead, pairs of
positive and negative adjectives (e.g., better and worse) were
used (see Section A of supplemental material available online
for a list of the adjectives). The word “equal” was presented for
ties.
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were shown
the seven cues on each trial and asked to choose which country
(“Country A” or “Country B”) would have higher GDP the
following year. Participants saw seven economic statistics with
a value for each country on each trial (see Figure 4 for an
example of stimulus presentation).
Figure 4. Example trial for the test phase of Experiment 2. Partici-
pants were required to choose the country that would have higher GDP
for the following year depending on the values of the economic statis-
tics presented. Participants were assigned either to the Tallying (TAL)
or the Take-the-Best (TTB) condition and asked to respond according to
what the respective heuristic would predict. In this example trial, TAL
would choose Country A because four cues have superior values
(positive adjectives) whereas Country B is only superior on three cues.
In contrast, TTB would choose Country B because the value for the
best-discriminating cue, which in this case is also the most predictive
cue (i.e., “Increased employment opportunities”), is superior to Coun-
try A.
Figure 3. Model-based analyses reveal cue usage for Take-the-Best (TTB) for Experiment 1. The
differences in how many cues were used in blocks without time pressure (blue bars) and with time pressure
(red bars) for the TTB condition. The vertical axis shows the proportion of participants that were best
described by one of the three models. Absent time pressure (blue bars), most participants’ decisions were
best fit by the full model using the best three cues, whereas with time pressure (red bars) some participants
appeared to rely on fewer cues. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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Results
Exclusion criteria. Exclusion criteria were the same as in
Experiment 1. Participants with performance under 90% in the
second half of the practice phase or over 16 missed responses
when under time pressure were considered outliers and excluded
from all subsequent analysis (8 in the TTB condition, 13 in the
TAL condition). Including the exclusion criteria from the practice
phase, this resulted in a total of 8.25% of participants who were
excluded from all further analyses in the TTB condition and 13.4%
of participants excluded from the TAL condition. Analyses were
also run without any exclusion2 and this did not change any
conclusions from the analyses shown below. All analyses that
follow use people who passed exclusion (n  173) to provide a
more stringent evaluation of our predictions. All response time
analyses were calculated with median response times.
Test phase. TAL participants had lower compliance than
TTB, mostly because they were affected more by the time pressure
manipulation (see panel A in Figure 5). Proportion of compliance
was analyzed using a 2  2  3 mixed-design ANOVA with a
between-subjects factor of heuristic (TAL, TTB), a within-
participants factor of time pressure (present or absent), and a
within-participants factor of trial difficulty (three levels of trial
difficulty). Main effects were observed for heuristic, F(1, 171) 
134.83, p  .001, 2  .44, time pressure, F(1, 171)  244.74,
p  .001, 2  .59, and trial difficulty, F(2, 342)  21.51, p 
.001, 2 .11, as well as an interaction between heuristic and time
pressure, F(1, 171)  135.95, p  .001, 2  .44, an interaction
between heuristic and trial difficulty, F(2, 342)  109.75, p 
.011, 2  .39, an interaction between time pressure and trial
difficulty, F(2, 342)  19.89, p  .001, 2  .10, and the
three-way interaction between heuristic, time pressure, and trial
difficulty, F(2, 354)  29.42, p  .001, 2  .15. These results
directly support our hypothesis by showing that when search costs
are eliminated and the representation of stimuli values obstruct
quick summations, then TAL has lower compliance than TTB,
especially under time pressure. The three-way interaction high-
lights the asymmetric effect of the time pressure manipulation on
both heuristics’ difficulty levels.
TAL participants responded more slowly than TTB participants
and were markedly slower on difficult trials (see panels d, e, and
f in Figure 5). Response times were analyzed using a 2  2  3
mixed-design ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of heuristic
(TAL, TTB), a within-participants factor of time pressure (present
or absent) and with a within-participants factor of trial difficulty
(three levels of trial difficulty). Individual response times were
calculated as median response times. Main effects were observed
for heuristic, F(1, 171)  171.41, p  .001, 2  .50, time
pressure, F(1, 171)  291.79, p  .001, 2  .63, and trial
difficulty, F(2, 342)  110.18, p  .001, 2  .39, as well as an
interaction between heuristic and time pressure, F(1, 171) 
186.14, p  .001, 2  .52, an interaction between heuristic and
trial difficulty, F(2, 342)  15.80, p  .001, 2  .09, an
interaction between time pressure and trial difficulty, F(2, 342) 
40.50, p  .001, 2  .19, and the three-way interaction between
heuristic, time pressure, and trial difficulty, F(2, 342)  22.11,
p  .001, 2  .11. The main effect of heuristic shows that TAL
is a slower heuristic than TTB and directly supports our main
hypothesis. For this experiment, the interaction between heuristic
and time pressure suggests that TTB can accommodate to time
pressure more readily than TAL can. The three-way interaction
shows that trial difficulty finds differences between heuristics in
both blocks, with and without time pressure, which provides
reassurance that participants were engaged and attempting to im-
plement the respective heuristic even for blocks with time pres-
sure.
Model-based analysis. As in Experiment 1, three models
were fit for the TTB condition to determine how many cues
participants tended to successfully incorporate under self-paced
and speeded conditions. As shown in Figure 6, the number of cues
successfully incorporated was not different under self-paced con-
ditions, suggesting that the TTB procedure was unaffected by time
pressure in this experiment. Fisher’s exact test found that the
model contingencies did not differ across self-paced and speeded
conditions (p  .840). Model agreement with human behavior
followed the same rationale as in Experiment 1 (see above).
Discussion
In accord with our hypothesis, Experiment 2 reversed the effect
found in Experiment 1—TAL was more strongly affected by time
pressure than TTB. TAL had lower compliance, particularly under
time pressure. One interesting side note is that TTB compliance
was better for difficult TTB trials, though these trials were also
slower which indicates a speed–accuracy trade-off. Overall, the
results in Experiment 2 reinforce the conclusions from Experiment
1, namely that heuristics are not monolithic and need to be de-
composed into their constituent cognitive processes to understand
and predict their performance under various task conditions.
General Discussion
Heuristics are often contrasted collectively with other decision
procedures, which could give the impression that heuristics form a
uniform class. Instead, we argued that heuristics are best under-
stood in terms of their constituent cognitive processes. When
decomposed into these processes, it becomes possible to predict
when people will be successful in applying given the demands of
the task.
In Experiment 1, stimulus format was chosen to suite the de-
mands of TAL at the expense of TTB. We found that the more
frugal heuristic (i.e., requiring less information), TTB, was slower
than the less frugal heuristic, TAL. We hypothesized this advan-
tage was because of the search costs incurred by TTB (cue order
was randomized) and the ability of TAL to take advantage of fast
perceptual summation operations (cue values were color-coded).
In Experiment 2, these advantages and disadvantages were re-
versed by ordering cues by their validity and removing color-
coding. As predicted, we observed an advantage of TTB over
TAL.
Our results mirror previous results using different experimental
procedures. As in Experiment 1, previous work finds that the time
requirements of TTB are dependent on the number of cues re-
2 We also conducted all analyses with participants that had 100% per-
formance in the second half of the practice phase (44 participants in the
TAL condition and 48 in the TTB condition) and this did not change any
conclusions presented here.
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trieved from memory (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder &
Gaissmaier, 2007; Khader et al., 2011; Lee & Cummins, 2004;
Newell & Shanks, 2003). These results dovetail with the notion
that TTB’s implementation involves greater complexity than its
algorithmic description suggests (Dougherty et al., 2008; Juslin &
Persson, 2002). The findings of Experiment 1 also resemble results
of another study where more cue information was processed
quicker, as long as the added information would increase coher-
ence among cues (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Conversely, partic-
ipants difficulties with TAL in Experiment 2 mirror previous
research exploring when people choose to adopt a compensatory
strategy (Bröder, 2003; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Platzer & Bröder,
2012; Platzer, Bröder, & Heck, 2014). A surprising result in
Experiment 2 was that proportion of compliance for TTB varied
with difficulty in the opposite direction of that which was pre-
dicted. However, the tradeoff observed between speed and accu-
racy limits the interpretation of this result (e.g., Ratcliff & Mc-
Koon, 2008).
Our results support the view that heuristics should be unpacked
in terms of the psychological processes they rely upon. One
important area for continued research is understanding how the
representational format of cues and their values affect performance
(Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Ideally,
this research would expand to consider other heuristics and to
conditions under which participants must choose which strategy to
adopt for a given environment (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). One
possibility is that participants are adaptive and choose the heuristic
procedure that minimizes the cognitive demands given the stimu-
lus format. The set of candidate solution procedures could extend
beyond heuristic procedures to include gist representations (Peters
et al., 2009; Reyna, 2008) and parallel constraint satisfaction
approaches (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Alternatively, there is also
recent work suggesting that heuristics can be viewed as a special
case of Bayesian inference (Parpart, Jones & Love, under revi-
sion).
In contrast to findings suggesting that participants tend to de-
fault to strategies similar to TTB under time pressure (Ben Zur &
Breznitz, 1981; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), we found in
Experiment 1 that compliance with TTB was dramatically reduced
by time pressure, whereas TAL was largely unaffected. As dis-
cussed, our choice of stimuli played an important role in deter-
mining these results, as observed when the stimuli were changed in
Experiment 2. Additionally, previous research has found that peo-
ple tend to use strategies more like TTB when the decision is
largely made from memory (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). In contrast,
people tend to use strategies more like TAL when the stimulus
conveys key information about the options (Bröder & Schiffer,
2003). Our findings, which follow from the predictions of our
attentional hypothesis, suggest a possible explanation for previous
Figure 5. Main results after applying exclusion criteria for Experiment 2 (n 173). The figure shows the proportion
of compliance with (a) both heuristics for blocks without time pressure (blue bars) and blocks with time pressure (red
bars), (b) the proportion of compliance in the Tallying (TAL) condition for blocks with and without time pressure
displayed by degrees of difficulty (deltas), and (c) the proportion of compliance in the Take-the-Best (TTB) condition
for blocks with and without time pressure displayed by degrees of difficulty (Qs). Shows the response times for (d)
both heuristics in both blocks with and without time pressure, (e) the response times in the TAL condition for blocks
with and without time pressure displayed by degrees of difficulty (deltas), and (f) the response times in the TTB
condition for blocks with and without time pressure displayed by degrees of difficulty (Qs). For all panels, error bars
are 95% within-participants confidence intervals. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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results. Likewise, our account may help explain the costs of
learning TTB.
An important limitation of these two studies is that they differ
from past research in that we directly instructed subjects on which
strategy to use, either TAL or TTB, and how to use them. For the
same reasons as another study (Khader et al., 2011), we preferred
to instruct participants to use these heuristics—instead of studying
their spontaneous use—as a preventive measure for strategy
switching. This detail provides the experimenters with more con-
trol over the task structure but it limits both comparison with other
studies that do not use instructed strategy use and the interpret-
ability of these results for real-world applications.
In conclusion, more frugal heuristics will not necessarily be
faster to implement than less frugal ones. Similarly, less frugal
strategies can be fast given the right stimuli format. To understand
how heuristics will perform across situations, the cognitive mech-
anisms that underlie heuristics need to be specified.
In light of these results, one important challenge is matching
heuristics to decision environments according to multiple factors,
such as stimulus format, time available, and cognitive resources.
One practical implication of this line of research is to inform those
who aim to best train people, such as emergency responders, to
appropriately match decision heuristics to the information and
cognitive demands of the task. Although there is much more yet to
do, our results make clear that heuristics are not universally “fast
and frugal” but in cases may be “fast or frugal.”
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